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JUSTIFYING BOARD DIVERSITY*
JAMES A. FANTO, LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, AND JOHN M. DARLEY**
In this Article, we point out that advocates for board diversity in public
companies feel pressure to justify it in terms of its contribution to
shareholder value. This pressure is not surprising, insofar as the
dominant social identity of boards, which itself is partly a creation of
the discipline of finance, views shareholder value as the ultimate
criterion for any company action, including eligibility for the board.
We observe, however, that accepting this criterion poses a problem for
diversity advocates, because the empirical evidence for a diverse
board's contribution to shareholder value is not strong or definitive,
and the chain of causation from a diverse board to increased
shareholder value is a long and tenuous one. We similarly note that
there is no conclusive evidence that a diverse board addresses well-
known pathologies of boards as decision-making groups and thus
improves board functioning. We draw parallels between this quandary
of diversity advocates in satisfying the shareholder value mandate and
recent antidiscrimination law jurisprudence, which, in discriminatory
impact settings, makes business necessity determinative of the outcome
of cases. We believe, however, that the lack of strong empirical support
for board diversity with respect to shareholder value or board
performance does not necessarily doom the cause of diversity
advocates. We argue that diversity advocates should endorse
justifications and normative frameworks other than shareholder value
to support diverse boards. Corporate law allows boards to base their
decisions with respect to many matters, including board composition,
on business-related grounds that are only loosely connected to
shareholder value. In our view, diversity advocates should take
advantage of this freedom, although we acknowledge the resistance to,
and risks associated with, any questioning of shareholder value. We
contend that if diversity advocates, as well as nondiverse board
members and others, justify board diversity on other grounds and
norms, they could promote a transformation in the social identity of
boards. This transformed identity might improve board functioning,
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but it is enough for us that it reflects and promotes antidiscriminatory
norms.
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INTRODUCTION
The basic test for many advocates of board diversity is to show
that gender, racial, ethnic, or other diversity improves the
performance of boards of public companies. Today's standard (and
almost exclusive) measure for the performance of firms, and thus of
boards, is shareholder value, which refers to the market value of a
firm's common shares and which originates from the discipline of
finance.! Thus, when proponents of board diversity feel compelled to
make their case within the standard framework (as many of them do),
they have to show, as an empirical matter, that boards with diverse
members outperform less diverse boards in enhancing the
shareholder value of their firms.
To our knowledge, the empirical studies to date have not
supported the case for board diversity on shareholder value grounds.2
This result may be due to shortcomings in the design of empirical
studies; further refinement may in time produce better evidence for
the diversity case. However, proponents of board diversity may not
want to pin all of their hopes on empirical results, for it has been
notoriously difficult to show that the design or composition of a
1. See, e.g., GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: How FINANCE
RESHAPED AMERICA 5-6, 45-46 (2009); MICHAEL C. JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF
ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY 51-102 (1998).
2. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
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corporate board improves or harms the firm's performance.' We
believe that this is because any causal chain between board
composition and shareholder value is an impossibly long one. It must
be remembered that the board of a public company in the United
States is generally a collection of busy executives from other firms
who (except in a crisis) gather together once a month to review and
approve the broad strategic direction of a firm.4 The chief executive
officer ("CEO") and her team actually operate the firm; the board
merely ratifies their decisions and strategies. Much of the relevant
literature on boards, therefore, suggests that a board's contribution to
firm value is likely to be minimal at best and hard to establish
empirically.'
Even if a board has limited influence on firm value, it still has
some impact, and one could justifiably inquire as to methods of
improving its functioning. Organizational and social psychological
literature identifies characteristics of well-performing decision-
making groups, like boards, as well as the pathologies of such groups.'
To cite only one well-known-and sometimes controversial-
example, cohesive groups have been found to engage in
"groupthink," a social phenomenon whereby group members adopt a
group identity that excludes other, different perspectives.' The
3. See generally Renee B. Adams et al., The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate
Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 58 (2010)
(surveying primarily the empirical literature on boards of directors, especially with respect
to the determinants of their make-up and their actions).
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. Adams et al. survey the empirical literature on specific contributions of boards to
issues related to firm value, such as dismissing a poorly performing CEO, hiring a new
CEO, and setting firm strategy. See Adams et al., supra note 3, at 64-80. This literature
shows the difficulties of drawing causal relationships between boards and firm
performance. Id.
6. See infra Part I.C.
7. See generally IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF
POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (rev. 2d ed. 1983) (the classic work identifying
"groupthink" in political decision-making groups). Social psychology and organizational
scholars do not accept all aspects of groupthink. Despite the need for refinement and
testing, however, it is clearly viewed as a useful perspective. See generally James K. Esser,
Alive and Well After 25 Years: A Review of Groupthink Research, 73 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 116 (1998) (reviewing empirical research
attempting to support the groupthink phenomenon and further theoretical developments
of the groupthink approach); Paul B. Paulus, Developing Consensus About Groupthink
After All These Years, 73 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 362
(1998) (discussing similarities between the groupthink approach and other studies of
groups). But see Sally Riggs Fuller & Ramon J. Aldag, Organizational Tonypandy:
Lessons from a Quarter Century of the Groupthink Phenomenon, 73 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 163, 167-69 (1998) (criticizing the theory as
erroneous, without empirical support, and oversimplified).
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cognitive and even emotional blinders produced by groupthink can
result in disasters for the group and the organization that it advises
and supervises.' By contrast, a group that defines its social identity by
openness to other perspectives and to internal debate may avoid
these pathologies and perform well in novel situations-situations
that public company boards often face.' The organizational and social
psychological literature also suggests, however, that having diverse
members in decision-making groups, without more, does not remedy
group decision-making problems or transform the social identity of a
group.o
We believe, however, that the lack of strong empirical support
for board diversity with respect to shareholder value, as well as the
lack of similar evidence for improvements in group decision making,
does not necessarily doom the cause of diversity advocates. Indeed,
we think that part of the problem lies with the framing of the issue,
which reaffirms the shareholder value rubric in the evaluation of
anything (like board composition) associated with a public firm.
Accepting this perspective means that diversity advocates must justify
board diversity on similar cost/benefit terms, such as value
improvement resulting from diverse boards attracting customers or
incentivizing employees. Moreover, the advocates may feel compelled
to make their arguments within this perspective of shareholder value
because they understand it to be shared by public company board
members, including members who are women and ethnic and racial
minorities. This acceptance is not surprising, for it has been inculcated
in the board members in their business school training and
professional experience."
We argue that diversity advocates should embrace justifications
and normative frameworks other than shareholder value to support
diverse boards. As we discuss below, the law allows boards to base
their decisions with respect to many matters, including board
8. See JANIS, supra note 7, at 174-77.
9. See id. at 263-71. On the basics of social identity theory, see Michael A. Hogg, A
Social Identity Theory of Leadership, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REv. 184, 186-87
(2001).
10. See generally Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of
Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223 (2004) (discussing the
difficulty in producing ethical conduct-individuals often convince themselves that they
are acting ethically, when in fact they are acting in a self-interested way).
11. See RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 317-26 (2007) (recounting the growth of
agency theory, with its shareholder value perspective, in U.S. business schools).
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composition, on business-related grounds that are only loosely
connected to shareholder value.12 Moreover, we feel that it is
important as a social and political matter to counter the dominance of
finance, with its shareholder value perspective, as the undisputed
source of norms for public firms. We believe that recognizing
alternative justifications for board composition provides scholars of
boards (including diversity advocates) with the opportunity to think
innovatively about board composition, such as from organizational
and social psychological perspectives. Although we believe that, in
certain circumstances, having diverse individuals on boards could
improve board decision making, or at least prevent group
pathologies, we do not argue that board diversity must be justified on
these functionalist grounds either.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly reviews the basic
legal structure and obligations of the public company board and the
dominance of the finance perspective. It also briefly surveys several
basic conclusions on board purpose and function drawn from the
organizational and social psychological literature (particularly social
identity theory). Part I then highlights, from the perspective of this
literature, problems associated with decision-making groups. In Part
II, we discuss our understanding that board diversity has not been
conclusively shown to increase shareholder value as an empirical
matter, which has put diversity advocates on the defensive. We draw
parallels between this situation and recent antidiscrimination law
jurisprudence, which, in discriminatory impact settings, makes
business necessity determinative of the outcome. Here we observe
that the application of this law to corporate boards would not
increase board diversity. In this Part, we also refer to findings in the
organizational and social psychological literature suggesting that the
addition of a few "outsiders," especially if they share the same
12. See infra Part II.A. Professor Kang points out in his commentary to this Article
that we appear to accuse diversity advocates of a kind of bad faith, or obtuseness, in
justifying diversity on the basis of shareholder value. See Jerry Kang, The Mismatch
Critique: Comment on Fanto, Solan, and Darley, 89 N.C. L. REV. 937, 939-40 (2011). In
this vein, he contends that we are not sufficiently sympathetic to the constraints that the
diversity advocates operate under. Id. at 940. These are fair criticisms, which he also made
to us at the conference. We acknowledge that, for many diversity advocates, the use of a
shareholder value justification for board diversity must be often just a strategy. We also
try to suggest below that the advocates should not have to shoulder alone the burden of
making a case for diverse boards. We do feel, however, that the power of the shareholder
value concept and its accompanying ideology should not be underestimated and that its
tactical use can have undesired consequences (e.g., the promotion of a few individuals
from diverse backgrounds into the corporate elite accompanied by the maintenance, and
indeed worsening, of wealth disparities in the United States).
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perspectives and background (i.e., the same social identity) with pre-
existing group members, does not ameliorate problems in group
decision making. In Part III, we argue that diversity advocates should
continue to offer normative frameworks other than finance-based
shareholder value to justify board diversity and should take
advantage of the flexibility of corporate law for this advocacy. We
also recognize the difficulties of this advocacy and explain that the
burden for it must not rest solely on diversity advocates. Instead,
recognition of other normative perspectives in firms allows for the
transformation of board social identity that may improve board
functioning, but board diversity does not depend upon this functional
outcome. We conclude with a call for use of these perspectives.
I. THE BOARD AND ITS PROBLEMS
A. Legal Structure and Obligations of Boards
Before beginning our discussion of board diversity, a brief
overview of the legal structure and foundation of the public company
board is in order. The corporate law of the firm's state of
incorporation and the jurisprudence of the courts of that state
primarily determine the board's structure and the obligations of
board members." Thus, the law establishes the board as the primary
supervisory body for the corporation, the manner of nomination and
election of board members, and the minimum qualifications for
directors. It also lays out in broad terms the duties of the board and
those of individual board members. Jurisprudence, primarily in
equity, further elaborates upon the duties of the board and its
members in many different circumstances. 14 For example, as is well
known, a detailed jurisprudence dictates the board's conduct when it
faces a change of control transaction." The discipline of finance,
however, with its focus on shareholder value, has influenced
corporate law jurisprudence, particularly in the influential state of
Delaware. Thus, while boards are entitled to make decisions based on
13. See JAMES A. FANTO, DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY § 1:3, at 1-11 to -12
(2d ed., release no. 4, 2009).
14. See, e.g., Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del.
2006) (discussing the board's basic duty of good faith); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858, 872 (Del. 1985) (discussing basic duty of care of directors), overruled on other grounds
by Gander v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
15. For the classic case on these duties, known by every business organization student,
see generally Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1985).
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what they perceive to be in the best interests of the firm and its
constituencies (e.g., employees and the communities in which the firm
operates), the message of the jurisprudence is often that boards
should ultimately base their decisions on the financial benefits to
shareholders.16
In the complicated legal world in which public companies
operate, other laws impose obligations on directors. Since public
companies are regulated participants in the securities markets, federal
securities laws and related stock exchange rules also affect the
structure, composition, and duties of a public company board." For
example, as a result of these laws and rules, public company boards
are composed primarily of independent directors and have audit,
compensation, and nominations committees composed only of such
directors with defined tasks and procedures.18 Among other things,
federal law requires board members to oversee any public offering of
the firm's securities,19 to avoid trading on inside information,20 and to
follow guidelines about disclosing nonpublic material information
either publicly or privately.2 1 As scholars have noted, directors must
also be concerned about not violating the myriad criminal laws
16. For example, this is the ultimate message of Revlon. See id. at 185; see also
Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (interpreting
Revlon).
17. The basic duties of public companies are found in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §H 78a-78nn (2006), and the Act's accompanying SEC rules, which
regulate the public securities markets. In general, companies whose securities are traded in
these markets are participants therein and are thus subject to regulation under that Act. A
public company has multiple disclosure obligations, including the filing of an annual report
on Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-1 (2010); the filing of quarterly reports on Form 10-Q,
§ 240.15d-13; the filing of "special" reports on Form 8-K whenever one of the events
enumerated in the Form occurs, § 240.15d-11; and the filing of a proxy statement for the
annual shareholders' meeting (as well as for special meetings), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3
(2010).
18. From a broad perspective, stock exchange rules require listed firms to have a
majority of independent directors. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (2002). Independent directors are
"outside" directors (i.e., nonemployee directors) who have no material financial or other
relationship with the firm or its executives. Federal securities laws require that the key
board committees be composed of such independent directors. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1(m)(3) (outlining requirements for audit committee members).
19. This comes from their liability through the registration statement for public
offerings. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(2) (2006).
20. This prohibition comes from section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b), and implementing Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
21. One such guideline is Regulation FD ("Fair Disclosure"), which mandates that
directors (among others) should not reveal nonpublic material information about their
company privately unless they simultaneously reveal it publicly. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-
.103 (2010).
908 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89
applicable to their conduct as board members.2 2 This list of legal
obligations could frighten anyone from becoming a board member
unless he realized that, apart from the criminal context and cases of
self-dealing, the law limits board members' liability. In addition,
firms purchase comprehensive directors' and officers' insurance
policies that pay for defense costs and any damages assessed against
them in all but the most egregious cases.24
Boards and firms do not exist in a vacuum and are also subject
to, or at least feel the pressure of, social norms relating to their
conduct. There are many codes of conduct and "best practices" for
board member behavior promulgated by interested associations, such
as the National Association of Corporate Directors,25 and by
institutional shareholders and their advisors.2 6 These codes no doubt
influence board conduct, but they are of no legal significance.27 in
addition, there are director codes or practices designed and pushed by
groups attempting to establish their norms in the boardroom; this
may well occur in the environmental, labor, or diversity areas.28 As in
22. See, e.g., FANTO, supra note 13, §§ 7:1-7:4, at 7-2 to -39, § 7:6, at 7-45 to -60.
23. Corporate law permits a firm in its certificate of incorporation to eliminate
damages against directors for violations of their duty of care. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
24. On this insurance, see FANTO, supra note 13, § 8:4, at 8-24 to -37. For a recent
study, see generally Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk:
Evidence from the Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
487 (2007) (concluding that corporate governance is a significant factor in determining a
firm's premium for directors' and officers' insurance).
25. See, e.g., NACD Bookstore, NAT'L ASS'N OF CORP. DIRECTORS,
http://www.nacdonline.org/Store (last visited Feb. 11, 2011) (providing resources for
corporate directors on topics ranging from board composition to ethics and compliance).
The Business Roundtable also provides codes and best practices for directors. See
Principles of Corporate Governance 2010, Bus. ROUNDTABLE, 1 (Apr. 2010),
http://businessroundtable.org/uploads/studiesreports/downloads/2010_Principles-of-Corp
orateGovernancel.pdf.
26. The most well known of the advisors to institutional investors is the firm
RiskMetrics (formerly Institutional Shareholder Services), which was recently acquired by
MSCI, Inc. See MSCI, http://www.msci.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2011). Again, as is also
well known, institutional investors adopt general policies on firm issues, including board
matters, since part of their investment strategy involves "indexing" (i.e., investing in the
entire stock market). See CAROLYN K. BRANCATO, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: BEST PRACTICES FOR INCREASING CORPORATE VALUE
27-28 (1997).
27. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697, 745 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(stating the limited effect of such best practices in corporate law), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006).
28. For a list of such groups with respect to diversity on boards of directors, see Lissa
Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone
Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431,432 n.1 (2008).
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the case of antidiscrimination laws, these norms may be enshrined in
the law and applicable to public firms.29
B. The Functions of Boards
Corporate boards are also the subject of organizational research
because the law identifies only part of what boards do. Under the law,
as discussed above, boards are the supervisors and monitors of the
firm. Their function essentially involves approving major strategies
and actions proposed by the CEO and his executive team and
ensuring that the overall control systems of the firm, again as
instituted by the executives, are adequate for the firm's business.3 0
From an organizational studies perspective, the board acts as a
monitor of executives and the firm.31
As discussed in the organizational literature, the board has other
nonlegal functions, including advising, networking, and signaling.
They are significant in the selection of board members and can thus
affect the number of qualified, diverse candidates for board positions.
Board members serve as advisors to the CEO and other major
executives on significant, often strategic, issues related to the firm.32
This function could limit the range of those who appear eligible for
board membership. Individuals who could offer advice on such issues
based upon their experience must generally be those who are current
or former CEOs, or who have had other significant executive
responsibilities (e.g., president of a nonprofit). Too much should not
be made of this experience, because it is conceivable that individuals
without executive experience, such as a management scholar, might
also be qualified to give good advice. What appears to matter for
board selection on this point is that CEOs are believed to take
seriously the advice only of those who have had this executive
experience and whom they consider to be their peers.33 Executive
29. As we discuss below, however, the laws may not apply to a typical director if he is
not an employee. See infra Part II.B.
30. On this latter duty to ensure that adequate control systems are in place, see Stone
ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
31. See COLIN B. CARTER & JAY W. LORSCH, BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD 67-
68 (2004) (discussing three key functions of a board: monitoring performance, making key
decisions, and giving advice); Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and
Corporate Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making
Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 489, 492 (1999) (discussing activities that a board may
participate in that increase the effectiveness of both the board and the company).
32. See Adams et al., supra note 3, at 64; Jonathan L. Johnson et al., Boards of
Directors: A Review and Research Agenda, 22 J. MGMT. 409, 424-25 (1996).
33. See, e.g., CARTER& LORSCH,supra note 31, at 115-16.
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background also gives a director credibility with his fellow board
members, for board members also advise the board on issues within
their areas of expertise. Indeed, a possible reason for the smaller
representation of women and racial and ethnic minorities on public
company boards is that members of these groups have not had the
necessary executive experience to qualify them for the advisory
function.' Firms go lower in the executive ranks to find diversity
candidates, but they risk undermining a director's advisory role or
relegating the director to an insignificant board function.3 5
As its name suggests, networking means that board members
provide the board and executives with useful connections to other
industries and activities.36 A board member with numerous
connections can be a valuable resource to a firm. A typical director, it
must be remembered, may be the CEO of another firm, a director of
several other firms, and a director of nonprofit organizations.3 7 These
connections can be useful to the firm, for a director with them brings
along knowledge of practices and strategies at other firms and can
identify acquisition targets and financing options." A particularly
important networking characteristic today comes from a director's
government "connections," which can arise from government service,
generally in the executive branch. These connections can be
particularly significant for firms in highly regulated industries or for
those doing considerable business with the government. For example,
a director within a network of existing and former government
34. Cf Nancy M. Carter & Christine Silva, Women in Management: Delusions of
Progress, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar. 2010, at 19, 19-21 (discussing the difficulties of women
in advancing in management ranks); Herminia Ibarra et al., Why Men Still Get More
Promotions than Women, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept. 2010, at 80, 82-85 (discussing the lack
of appropriate mentoring for women that will take them into top management).
35. See JULIE HEMBROCK DAUM ET AL., SPENCER STUART, 2006 BOARD
DIVERSITY REPORT 11-12 (2006), available at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/
pdfliblBoard DiversityReport2006.pdf (discussing how women and ethnic and racial
minority directors have been drawn from other senior executive positions and from
executive positions in nonprofits).
36. See Amy J. Hillman et al., Organizational Predictors of Women on Corporate
Boards, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 941, 942 (2007).
37. To take one example, among many, William C. Weldon is Chairman/CEO of
Johnson & Johnson, a director of JPMorgan Chase, and a trustee for Quinnipiac
University (among other nonprofit positions). See JPMORGAN CHASE, PROXY
STATEMENT 5 (2010), available at http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/annual
.cfm.
38. See Johnson et al., supra note 32, at 427-29. See generally Christine Shropshire,
The Role of the Interlocking Director and Board Receptivity in the Diffusion of Practices,
35 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 246, 246-47 (2010) (discussing, from a theoretical perspective, the
characteristics of directors that promote diffusion of practices among firms as a result of
interlocking directors).
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officials can assist executives with regulatory issues and advise them
and the board on relevant legislative and regulatory changes, and she
may even act as an indirect lobbyist for a firm.3 9 This function can be
an avenue to the board for women and ethnic and racial minorities
who have not had the typical experience as a CEO to qualify them for
board service.'
The networking function is related to the signaling function,
which arises from the "symbolic capital" of a director.4 1 Signaling
means that a board member enhances the firm in the eyes of
employees, customers, and the general public simply by his
membership on the board.42 How this enhancement occurs, of course,
depends upon the observer and is difficult to measure. 43 A high-
profile, female, former government regulator who becomes a director
may, for example, raise a firm's reputation among current regulators,
as well as among women customers and employees who appreciate
female representation on the board. If, to take another example,
Warren Buffett were to join a board, he would bring to it his prestige
of being the "master" investor and would signal to the investment
community his belief that the firm is valuable." Since symbolic capital
is a broad concept and since a person's presence on a board can send
all kinds of signals, including a firm's commitment to gender, racial,
39. Recently, a U.S. firm, Amerilink Telecom Corporation, decided to market
telecommunications equipment made by a Chinese manufacturer. See Spencer E. Ante &
Shayndi Raice, Dignitaries Come on Board to Ease Huawei into U.S., WALL ST. J., Sept.
21, 2010, at B1. Amerilink brought on its board of directors former House majority leader
Richard Gephardt and former World Bank head James Wolfensohn to help the firm
overcome security concerns by U.S. government officials over the use of Chinese
telecommunications equipment in the United States. Id. Amerilink's founder and CEO is
a former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Id.
40. Examples come to mind, such as Vernon Jordan, who began as a civil rights
lawyer, served as a senior advisor to former President Bill Clinton, and is now the ultimate
corporate insider with numerous director positions. See Vernon E. Jordan Jr., AKIN GUMP
STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, http://www.akingump.com/vjordan/ (last visited Feb. 12,
2011). For a brief biography of Mr. Jordan, see the website of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer
& Feld, id., where he is a senior counsel. Id.
41. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, LA NOBLESSE D'ETAT: GRANDES tCOLES ET ESPRIT
DE CORPs 110-111 (1989) (discussing the creation of symbolic capital through schooling).
Bourdieu's notion of symbolic capital is that it can be amassed and exchanged in a way not
unlike "hard" capital or assets. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, LE SENS PRATIQUE 202-04 (1980).
42. See Johnson et al., supra note 32, at 411 (referring to this function as a resource
dependence one).
43. See Broome & Krawiec, supra note 28, at 447-52.
44. Arguably, he did as much when he invested in Goldman Sachs during the financial
crisis. See ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF How WALL
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS-
AND THEMSELVES 485-87 (2009).
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and ethnic diversity, it is not always easy to trace how this symbolic
capital translates into economic capital (i.e., shareholder value).45
However, to the extent that women and ethnic minorities have not
advanced in appropriate numbers to senior positions in corporate and
nonprofit hierarchies, which produce symbolic capital, the signaling
function of the board may contribute to keeping them off corporate
boards.
C. Board Socialization
A major complaint about public company boards is that they go
along with value-destroying strategies pushed by the CEO and the
executive team and that they are not active enough in detecting fraud
or overreaching. Examples come readily to mind: boards approve
mergers that prove to be ultimately destructive, 46 rubber-stamp
outsized compensation packages,47 or do not question suspicious
transactions.' After a firm disaster or scandal, there are always
questions about why the board did not see and then prevent the
problem and why the board passively approved of a destructive
business strategy.
There is considerable jurisprudence on the legal responsibility of
directors in different circumstances as well as a voluminous legal
literature on improving board performance. 49 This jurisprudence and
literature understandably focuses on the board's monitoring or
supervisory function. As the literature recognizes, many problems
arise from the somewhat unique position of board members, who are
the ultimate supervisors of a public firm, but who generally have full-
time, high-level positions elsewhere and thus only limited time to
45. See generally Luigi Guiso et al., Civic Capital as the Missing Link 1 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15,845, 2010), available at http://faculty.chicago
booth.edulluigi.zingales/research/papers/civic-cap.pdf (criticizing the vagueness and use of
the concept of symbolic capital).
46. For a discussion of the literature on this topic, see generally James A. Fanto,
Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49
BUFF. L. REV. 249 (2001).
47. A classic case is In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006), which also shows how, in the absence of a conflict of interest, directors are rarely
found liable for highly questionable business decisions. Id. at 66-68.
48. The textbook case involves the directors of Enron, who passively approved the
accounting irregularities designed by the firm's senior executives. See In re Enron Corp.
Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 613-37 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
49. Jurisprudence on legal obligations of directors is reviewed in FANTO, supra note
13, § 1:3, at 1-11; some of the scholarly jurisprudence is discussed in Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governace, 97 Nw. U. L.
REV. 547, 561-73 (2003). Representative citations to the economic and finance literature
on this subject appear in Adams et al., supra note 3, at 102-07.
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devote to their board work." Since they are outsiders, moreover, they
are highly dependent for information upon executives, who can
manage the information flow to a board. As is well known, board
reform through corporate and securities law, as well as through board
best practices, encourages board members to spend more time with
the firm and provides them with their own sources of information
about the firm, independent of executives."' To take only one
example, as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms, the board audit
committee has a direct relationship with a firm's outside auditors,
who report to it.52
Boards are decision-making and advisory groups, even if their
decisions are more akin to an approval or disapproval of executive
proposals. Accordingly, they are prone to many of the group
pathologies that social psychologists and organizational theorists have
detected in decision-making groups." One well-known group
pathology is "groupthink." In its classic description, groupthink
appears when group members embrace a group viewpoint (generally
one adopted by a strong leader), enforce conformity with that
viewpoint among fellow group members, react hostilely to anyone
(whether insider or outsider) challenging it, and maintain the
perspective even in the face of conflicting evidence.54 Groups in the
thrall of groupthink can make disastrous decisions, often because they
ignore conflicting viewpoints and evidence.5
50. See CARTER & LORSCH, supra note 31, at 22; see also SPENCER STUART,
SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 24 (2009), available at http://content.spencerstuart.com/
sswebsite/pdf/lib/SSB12009.pdf (noting that annual board meetings have increased to an
average of nine meetings per year).
51. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 50, at 11-12 (discussing the increasing practice
of public companies to restrict the number of other directorships any board member may
have).
52. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-77
(2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2006)).
53. See generally John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into
Evildoing, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 13
(David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996) (discussing organizational, rather
than individual, thinking by members of the board).
54. The classic work on groupthink is JANIS, supra note 7. For representative
discussions of this phenomenon, see, for example, Randall S. Peterson et al., Group
Dynamics in Top Management Teams: Groupthink, Vigilance, and Alternative Models of
Organizational Failure and Success, 73 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 272,273 (1998); Marlene E. Turner & Anthony R. Pratkanis, A Social Identity
Maintenance Model of Groupthink, 73 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 210,220-22 (1998).
55. In his book Janis provides examples of the phenomenon in government decision
making. See, e.g., JANIS, supra note 7, at 198-241 (discussing groupthink in the Watergate
scandal). For other examples, see generally Emily Pronin, How We See Ourselves and
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For the most part, one can only speculate as to what exactly
occurs in boardrooms, since boards are an elite, closed environment
accessible to few persons (and few academics)." Yet social identity
research has shown that in various contexts the individual self takes
on identities in accordance with the groups with whom it associates."
Thus, the social identity associated with board membership is likely to
influence board functioning and may be a source of pathology. From
the perspective of social identity theory, directors assume a particular
identity when they become board members, leaving other identities at
the door of the boardroom.s Each board, of course, has its own
particular version of this identity, for boards are all idiosyncratic
groups to some extent. 9 However, one could posit that the social
identities of all boards share certain (one might call them
"institutional") features, which include a belief structure and a code
of conduct. Under the belief structure, directors accept that the firm
exists primarily for shareholder value and thus that board members
should promote this goal.' This structure would also include an
awareness of and a pride in the elevated social position that goes
along with board membership, which carries with it a concept of
infallibility in decisions.' The code of conduct would include
deference to the CEO and the executive team, as well as to long-
standing board members, and a collegiality that requires conflict
How We See Others, 320 SCIENCE 1177 (2008) (discussing the introspection fallacy,
whereby people look into their own prior thinking and find nothing wrong, but look at the
actions of others and discover bias).
56. See Adams et al., supra note 3, at 59.
57. See S. ALEXANDER HASLAM, PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE SOCIAL
IDENTITY APPROACH 17,30 (2d ed. 2004).
58. Id. at 17.
59. See CARTER & LORSCH, supra note 31, at 8-9 (discussing how boards have their
own individual needs and structures).
60. See Sumantra Ghoshal, Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good
Management Practices, 4 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 75, 75-77 (2005); Dennis A.
Gioia, Business Education's Role in the Crisis of Corporate Confidence, ACAD. MGMT.
EXECUTIVE, Aug. 2002, at 142, 143, The shareholder value perspective has become part of
board members' identity, since they have been taught this perspective in business school,
and it has been reinforced throughout their professional experience. Of course, part of the
social identity of boards and of business more generally, which is also reinforced in
business school education, is that diversity is irrelevant for job performance and that
success in business is gender neutral. See Elisabeth K. Kelan & Rachel Dunkley Jones,
Gender and the MBA, 9 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDuC. 26,38-39 (2010).
61. See KARL E. WEICK, MAKING SENSE OF THE ORGANIZATION 370-71 (2001);
David M. Messick & Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of
Decision Making, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Winter 1996, at 9,17-18.
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avoidance.62 In addition, this board social identity is constantly
reinforced, for board members come from contexts where the identity
reigns. Indeed, a person known for being "different" (i.e., not
adequately embracing this social identity) would not be selected for
(or renominated to) a board, under the euphemism that he would not
be the right "fit." Social psychological research suggests that groups
with this kind of social identity, if it becomes extreme, are prone to
decision-making errors, since the social identity does not allow for
cognitive conflict and encourages self-censorship on the part of its
members.63
Another way of characterizing this socialization of a board
member is that the standard process of recruiting a director is
generally one that involves intensive and complex selection
components." Moreover, once a candidate is tentatively selected,
often indirect but always well-understood patterns of communication
take place between the candidate and the members of the nominating
committee and/or the CEO to ensure that all parties understand what
the firm expects of the board member.' It is in the final stages of this
''vetting process" that the candidate has the chance to make clear the
matters that are of importance to her, the ways in which she will
advocate on those matters, and perhaps most important, her
understanding of the limits that exist on the conduct of her
advocacy."
We would hypothesize that, in the case of a "diversity"
candidate, there is usually information available and understandings
shared that make the conduct of this implicit negotiation process go
quite smoothly. First, those performing the corporate side of the
encounter will have decided that, on balance, the corporation will
62. See JAY W. LORSCH WITH ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE
REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 91-96 (1989).
63. For representative discussions of this phenomenon, see Vikas Anand et al.,
Business as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation of Corruption in Organizations,
ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Nov. 2005, at 9, 11; Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas Anand, The
Normalization of Corruption in Organizations, 25 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 10
(2003).
64. See LORSCH WITH MACIVER, supra note 62, at 20.
65. The above describes the standard board candidate selection process as conducted
by a management team that strategizes carefully. This is not to deny that some companies,
perhaps led by confident entrepreneurs, conduct the process in a more impulsive way,
perhaps leading to the dreaded outcome of a "runaway" board member.
66. See Lissa L. Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Dangerous
Categories: Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 777-78 (2011)
(discussing a CEO's investigation to discover if a sought-after female director had "three
heads or something").
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gain from appointing "diversity" board members. Second, since the
diversity candidates typically will have been on other corporate
boards or, failing that, will have functioned in other organizational
settings, their conduct in those settings can be investigated, generally
through informal channels. What they will advocate for is likely to
have been revealed by their actions in these previous settings. One
aspect of their conduct that will be particularly investigated concerns
whether they can stay within the bounds of "tactful advocacy" that is
normative in board meetings, especially when the new member is, as
is expected, promoting diversity policies.67
Our sense is that there will often be informal "go-betweens,"
third parties who are acquainted with the officers and board members
of the corporation and with the board candidate, who "casually
encounter" the candidate and raise the needed questions about the
candidate's understanding of the implicit belief structure and codes of
conduct of boards.' The board candidate can use the occasion to set
forth his advocacy position (e.g., the kinds of hiring practices and
perhaps flex-time working hours for which he would advocate). The
"go-between" can probe for a sense of how far the prospective board
member would push his points. By these conversations, which take
place between socially adroit persons, reasonably clear
understandings about advocacy and its limits can be negotiated.69 In
addition, it is likely that the CEO has already decided in advance of
these conversations that some movement in these directions is
67. "Tactful advocacy" here means advocacy that does not ultimately challenge the
shareholder value goal of the firm and may often result in no advocacy at all (in other
words, silence). Cf Frances J. Milliken & Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison, Shades of Silence:
Emerging Themes and Future Directions for Research on Silence in Organizations, 40 J.
MGMT. STUD. 1563, 1563-67 (2003) (discussing the problems raised by organizational
silence and organizational research in this domain). Sometimes the new board member's
advocacy is not expected to be typically "tactful," but it is nonetheless accepted. In the last
quarter of the twentieth century, if one invited the Reverend Leon Sullivan to join a
corporate board, it was completely understood that the firm would adopt his "Sullivan
Principles," which pledged the corporation to pressure South African corporations to
integrate their work force and adopt other principles of social responsibility. See A
Principled Man: Rev. Leon Sullivan, MARSHALL UNIV., http://muweb.marshall.edu/
revleonsullivan/indexf.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
68. See Roderick M. Kramer, Trust and Distrust in Organizations, 50 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 569, 577 (1999) (discussing the role of "go-betweens" in developing trust in new
relationships).
69. One technique used by experienced "go-betweens" is the "admonitory tale." This
is a story about a specific other person (often created for admonitory purposes) who "went
too far"-who advocated too strongly for his position or somehow otherwise violated
some subtle rule of conduct-and lost effectiveness forever. These stories are very
powerful, in that they vividly and concretely shine a bright light on the otherwise invisible
line that a person must not cross.
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desirable and so is willing to support, to a limited extent, the diverse
board member's suggestions. 0
At any point in the vetting process, the diversity candidate is free
to terminate his consideration of the position. A principled candidate
will do this when he judges that the corporation cannot move far
enough in the diversity direction. Putting this in terms of his own
reputation, to accept a board position for only modest diversity gains
would send a false signal to those for whom the candidate is a
representative." There are ways of withdrawing from consideration
gracefully, which enable the corporation not to lose face. The
corporate leaders might even decide to re-approach the diversity
candidate in the future, when they are able to consider making a
stronger set of adaptations.
Having set forth the legal and functional background on boards,
as well as our understanding of boards as decision-making groups, we
turn to explore how board diversity has been justified.
II. THE FAILED EMPIRICAL CASE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY
A. Shareholder Value Perspective
We find that proponents of board diversity often feel obligated
to justify it on the basis of shareholder value. That is, they wish to
show that an increase in board diversity correlates with an increase in
shareholder value. A central problem of this approach is that, so far
at least, the proponents have been unable to provide firm empirical
support for board diversity. Existing studies provide inconclusive
evidence of the benefit, from a shareholder value perspective, of
increasing the number of women and ethnic and racial minorities on
70. Any CEO who contemplates having a diverse person on the board will realize that
the diverse person must be able to make some claims that her community benefits from
her presence on the board. The obvious "good" is to have the company publically put
energy in diversity hiring. The smart CEO and the smart board candidate will have
implicitly negotiated some package of hiring efforts in advance of the diverse person
joining the board. A smart CEO is (mildly) happy about this, given the various legal
pressures not to discriminate in hiring. So, from this "realist" perspective, we should not
expect much more from the board selecting a diverse person than some (pre-negotiated)
increased efforts on diversity hiring. See, e.g., supra note 67.
71. In symbolic capital terms, the director will have made a bad exchange for the
symbolic capital he conveys to the firm through his membership on the board. See, e.g.,
PIERRE BOURDIEU, LA DISTINCTION: CRITIQUE SOCIALE DU JUGEMENT 158 (1979)
(discussing how, in the educational context, it is important for one to understand the
careers that carry the promise of the most symbolic capital and thus the most economic
capital).
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public company boards.72 Of course, as more women and minorities
become directors, there will be further data for the studies, which
may ultimately show more positive connections between diversity and
increased shareholder value.
This lack of strong empirical evidence is not surprising, for
empirical studies with respect to the effect of most features of board
structure and composition on shareholder value have generally had
inconclusive results. For example, although the predominance of
independent board members on public company boards has become a
legal and practical reality for U.S. companies, the conclusion that
independent board members increase shareholder value is subject to
debate as an empirical matter." Similar debates have occurred as to
empirical evidence for other aspects of board structure, such as
having an independent chair in the board position who is not the
CEO.74 Again, these results, including those on board diversity, are
understandable because board members are responsible for a
relatively insignificant part of a firm's affairs, even if they have an
important place in corporate governance.75
As a legal matter, since boards are paramount in the governance
of public firms, any board could decide to propose to shareholders to
increase its diversity." A board could justify this decision on general
72. See Broome & Krawiec, supra note 28, at 432-33 (reviewing the studies); Aaron
A. Dhir, Towards a Race and Gender-Conscious Conception of the Firm: Canadian
Corporate Governance, Law and Diversity, 35 QUEEN'S L.J. 569, 591-99 (2010) (reviewing
studies); Sabina Nielsen et al., Board Diversity and Firm Performance: An Empirical
Investigation of the Mediating Effects of Board Processes and Task Performance (Acad. of
Mgmt. Proceedings, No. 14,474, 2008), available at http://www.ebscohost.com/academic
.business-source-premier (accessible through fee-based membership).
73. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 231-34 (2002)
(discussing the lack of evidence for the benefit of independent board members).
74. See Adams et al., supra note 3, at 80-86 (discussing this and other empirical
matters). See generally Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship
Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921 (1999) (providing
econometric evidence dealing with the composition of the board between independent
and nonindependent directors and its effect on various measurements of board and firm
performance).
75. On the other hand, studies have shown that a diverse board may be negatively
related to firm performance as a result of the implicit bias of certain institutional investors,
who may find that a too diverse board suggests that the board has lost its focus on
shareholder value. See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, Corporate Board Gender
Diversity and Stock Performance: The Competence Gap or Institutional Investor Bias?, 89
N.C. L. REV. 809,833-34 (2011).
76. Spencer Stuart reports that the representation of women and ethnic minorities on
boards of large public companies has plateaued over the last five years, at sixteen and
fifteen percent respectively, although board members say that they would like to have
greater representation. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 50, at 15, 18.
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business-related grounds (e.g., improvement in customer and
employee relations or demonstration of compliance with social norms
that will create a favorable media view of the company) even if it has
no hard empirical evidence for the decision. Under established law,
this kind of decision would be sustained by the courts as an
appropriate "business judgment" by the board, for, as is well known,
courts accord considerable deference to boards on "business"
matters." In sum, diversity advocates do not need a failsafe empirical
case for the benefits of board diversity in order to promote their
cause; they just need to make persuasive, business-related arguments
and have them adopted in board circles."
Why, then, cannot diversity advocates be content with winning
the diversity war without winning the empirical battle? Certainly, one
answer is that, if the advocates are scholars, they would like to base
their advocacy on solid empirical grounds." More significantly, they
no doubt realize that there are probably limits to how far generalized
business justifications, which have no unassailable empirical support
in shareholder value, will take them in financial and investment
circles. That is, shareholder value is the bottom-line focus of members
of these circles on any significant matter with respect to a firm.o To
take an extreme example, suppose that a firm adopted a significant
board diversity policy, such as suggesting to shareholders that board
membership reflect gender, ethnic, and racial percentages in the
United States, and justified this policy on general business grounds.
The board realistically has to fear that investors might be suspicious
of this policy because its adoption shows that the board is not
adequately focusing on shareholder value." This board is likely to be
punished gradually, as share price falls and investor pressure builds
77. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985), overruled on other
grounds by Ganter v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
78. Indeed, if anything, SEC regulation encourages boards to include diverse
members, for it requires companies to disclose in their annual proxy statements "whether,
and if so how, the nominating committee (or the board) considers diversity in identifying
nominees for director." 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010).
79. This seems to be especially true if the advocates subscribe to a shareholder value
perspective. Moreover, there is a general trend toward empirical work in legal scholarship.
See, e.g., Conference on Empirical Legal Studies 2010, YALE LAW SCH.,
http://www.law.yale.edu/news/CELS.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
80. Of course, in certain circumstances, the shareholder value norm may be trumped
by law, such as statutes forbidding discrimination, as we discuss further below. See infra
Part II.B.
81. There may also be a discriminatory animus involved in this reaction by investors,
even if it happens at the subconscious level. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair
Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmative Action," 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063,
1064 (2006).
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for the board to get its eyes back on the appropriate focus.' Given
that, in our view, diversity advocates probably fear that this
punishment is the likely outcome for boards proposing significant
board diversity initiatives, we think that they accept the status quo at
least until they can bring forward stronger empirical support of the
benefits of diversity, or until the investment and board community
accepts diversity without such support. And the status quo appears to
mean a slow-moving, incremental diversification.83
B. The Inadequacy of Civil Rights Law to Motivate Board Diversity
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal to discriminate in
employment practices. The statute prohibits not only the disparate
treatment of those whom the firm employs or those who seek
employment at the firm, it also prohibits practices that have a
disparate impact on protected groups, unless these practices can be
justified by a legitimate business reason." Yet there is a peculiar
island in the business world-the island of corporate boards-that
this Act does not directly affect. It does not apply to corporate board
membership because board members, with the exception of the few
executives on the board," are usually not employees.86 In fact, courts
82. Again, the contribution of Dobbin and Jung to this conference issue provides
empirical support for this scenario. Their research shows that the increase of women
directors on boards results in a drop in share value of the companies involved, and that
this decline in value is due to sales by institutional investors, other than public pension
funds, which overwhelms any buying pressure by the funds. Dobbin & Jung, supra note 75,
at 834-35. They suggest that there is no reason for the sales other than explicit or implicit
bias, as the presence of women on boards has not been shown to decrease firm
performance. Id. at 837.
83. Statistics on the incremental increases of women on boards are available at
CATALYST, http://www.catalyst.org (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). See also SPENCER STUART,
supra note 50, at 8, 15, 18 (reporting on the percentage of women and minorities on
boards). In this paragraph, we acknowledge that diversity advocates are using the
shareholder value justification as a strategic move under the constraints within which they
must work-an acknowledgement in response to Professor Kang's criticism. See Kang,
supra note 12, at 942.
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
85. See Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529,
1537-40 (2d Cir. 1996).
86. The Supreme Court has set forth guidelines for determining when a board
member should be considered an employee. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v.
Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449-51 (2003). A typical board member will not be considered an
employee. See Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O'Brien, Who Counts?: The United
States Supreme Court Cites "Control" as the Key to Distinguishing Employers from
Employees Under Federal Employment Antidiscrimination Laws, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 761, 787 ("The language in the EEOC guidance indicates that principals must
overcome a presumption that they are employers.").
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routinely hold that the statute does not apply to corporate directors.'
As the Seventh Circuit has put it: "Directors are traditionally
employer rather than employee positions."'
We believe that the advocates' concern about board diversity is
primarily motivated by the perception of, and unhappiness with, this
gap in the law because it runs counter to the social values that
undergird the Civil Rights Act. This motivation would seemingly
render the arguments about the business advantage of diverse boards
irrelevant. For if those who support diversifying corporate boards do
so because they believe diversity to be a worthy value in its own right,
then the arguments about whether diversification enriches
shareholders would seem to be a necessary intellectual justification,
but not one of significant concern.
However, ironically and as discussed below, the United States
Supreme Court has emphasized the "business" limitations argument
in the interpretation of the civil rights laws. This pushes the intent of
these laws into the background and validates the business purpose,
which actually reinforces the shareholder value perspective.
Moreover, many, including a majority of the Justices currently sitting
on the Supreme Court, draw a distinction between a ban on racist or
sexist practices, on the one hand, and an affirmative effort to create a
diverse, elite culture, on the other. If the civil rights laws are
construed to encourage only the former, then those who are
motivated by norms established by the Civil Rights Act will find
themselves having to break new ground. And it may well be that the
domain of the corporate board of directors is a particularly difficult
arena in which to do that. We think that it is useful to explain this
outcome in more detail.
There is no doubt that nondiscrimination has become a social
norm in its own right, just as discrimination was itself formerly an
acceptable social norm." The law, moreover, has played a significant
role in the transformation of these norms. In nationwide polls of
whites taken before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
fifty-five percent of respondents said that white people should have
the first opportunity at any job.90 By the 1970s, that number shrank to
87. See De Jesds v. LTT Card Servs., Inc., 474 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2007) (applying the
Clackamas standard to a closely held corporation).
88. Chavero v. Local 241, Div. of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 787 F.2d 1154,
1157 (7th Cir. 1986).
89. See ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 133-43 (2000).
90. HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND
INTERPRETATIONS 104 (2d ed. 1997).
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three percent.9' By the same token, the percentage of people who
favor segregation in transportation shrank from fifty-four percent to
twelve percent.' One may be surprised that one of eight people
continued to hold this view as late as the 1970s, but the change in
social norms is abundantly clear. There can be no doubt that decades
of the everyday experience of not permitting such practices has led to
people adopting the view that nondiscrimination is simply right as a
social value.
Cass Sunstein observes:
If a discriminatory act is consistent with prevailing norms, there
will be more in the way of discriminatory behavior. If
discriminators are ashamed of themselves, there is likely to be
less discrimination. The social meaning of an act of sexual
harassment will have a great deal to do with the amount of
sexual harassment in that particular environment. A large point
of law may be to shift social norms and social meaning.
Consider in this connection the fact that many restaurant
owners and inn-keepers actually supported the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which would have prevented them from discriminating.
Why would people want the state to act against them? The
answer lies in the fact that the law helped shift social norms and
the social meaning of nondiscrimination. Whereas
nondiscrimination would formerly signal a willingness to act on
a race-neutral basis-and hence would trigger social norms that
call for discrimination against blacks-it would henceforth
signal a willingness to obey the law, and hence fail to trigger
adverse social norms.93
Nonetheless, when it comes to diversity as a social value to be
affirmatively sought, neither the law nor the opinion polls show
uniform support. A New York Times/CBS News poll taken in 2010
showed that twenty-eight percent of all respondents and fifty-two
percent of those identifying themselves with the Tea Party movement
believed that "in recent years too much has been made of the
problems facing black people."94 As for the courts, the Supreme
Court has on several occasions attempted to distinguish between
race-neutral decision making, on the one hand, and affirmative efforts
91. Id. at 105.
92. Id. at 104-05.
93. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021,
2043-44 (1996).
94. See Kate Zernike & Megan Thee-Brenan, Discontent's Demography: Who Backs
the Tea Party, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2010, at Al.
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to diversify, on the other, approving only of the former except in
limited circumstances.
The Civil Rights Act states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin . . . .9
This covers cases of disparate treatment and disparate impact.96
Not only may an employer not discriminate in its employment
practices because of a person's "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin," it must justify practices that result in prima facie
discriminatory effects even when the employer did not intentionally
discriminate. Were the statute to apply to corporate boards, it would
disallow intentional efforts to deny board membership to the various
protected groups, and it would impose more scrutiny on practices that
result in a lack of diversity as a side effect.
The situation is complicated by the relationship between the
disparate treatment and disparate impact prongs of the law. Efforts to
remedy past discrimination resulting from disparate impact risk
disadvantaging white males in a manner that might be considered
disparate treatment of them. The Supreme Court began balancing
these concerns in 1978 with Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke" and has deemphasized diversity as a legitimate ground for
making admissions decisions in education and employment decisions
since then.99 In Bakke, the Court held that a white medical school
applicant had been unconstitutionally denied admission to a state
medical school that had set aside a certain number of seats for
minority applicants.1" Justice Powell's plurality opinion permitted
race to be considered as one factor in assessing applicants, but not as
the only consideration:
95. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
96. See infra notes 107-19 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship
between disparate impact and disparate treatment in the context of Ricci v. DeStefano,
129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009)).
97. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
98. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
99. See infra notes 102-19 and accompanying text (discussing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003), which tolerates diversity as a value in higher education, and Ricci v.
DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), which refuses to tolerate diversity as a value in
employment decisions).
100. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
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It may be assumed that the reservation of a specified number of
seats in each class for individuals from the preferred ethnic
groups would contribute to the attainment of considerable
ethnic diversity in the student body. But petitioner's argument
that this is the only effective means of serving the interest of
diversity is seriously flawed. In a most fundamental sense the
argument misconceives the nature of the state interest that
would justify consideration of race or ethnic background. It is
not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified
percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be
members of selected ethnic groups, with the remaining
percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of students. The
diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a
far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.
Petitioner's special admissions program, focused solely on
ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of
genuine diversity.'
Some twenty-five years later, the Court reaffirmed this approach
in Grutter v. Bollinger"0 by upholding the University of Michigan
Law School's admissions policy, which included race as one factor of
many.'03 Both Bakke and Grutter involved heavily divided courts. In
Bakke, four Justices would have struck down the California scheme
as violative of the civil rights laws, and four would have upheld the
scheme as a legitimate effort to combat past discrimination.'1 Justice
Powell was the lone vote for disallowing the plan as it was designed,
but allowing some room for diversity in admissions decisions.05
Grutter was a five-to-four decision, with Justice O'Connor writing the
opinion of the Court.'06
Both Powell and O'Connor have left the Court, and its latest
decision, this time in the context of public employment, displays a
more aggressive rejection of diversity as a value when it can be
achieved only at the expense of the disparate treatment of white
employees. Ricci v. DeStefano,'" a 2009 case, involved the New
Haven (Connecticut) Fire Department's use of a test to certify
101. Id. at 315.
102. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
103. Id. at 341.
104. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 267.
105. Id.
106. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310.
107. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
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employees for promotion.os The result of the test given in 2003 was
that the eight available lieutenant positions would all go to white
candidates, and the seven vacant captain positions would go to
members of a group consisting of seven whites and two Hispanics.'o9
No black person would be promoted.10 While a number of black
firefighters had passed the test, promotions were scheduled to be
offered in order of the test scores, and the available positions would
be taken before any African American would be eligible."'
As a result of the apparent racially disparate consequences, or
"impact," of the test results, New Haven's Civil Service Board held
hearings, which included discussion of whether testing methods used
by other cities should have been employed since they might have
resulted in less racial disparity.!"2 The board ultimately decided not to
certify the results of the test.'13 As a consequence, certain white
firefighters who would have been promoted based on their test scores
brought an antidiscrimination lawsuit.114 At the same time, African
American firefighters who had passed the test with lower scores than
the white firefighters threatened to bring a disparate impact claim if
they were not promoted."' This litigation made its way to the
Supreme Court, which ruled in a five-to-four decision that the
disparate treatment claim brought by the white firefighters trumped
the threatened disparate impact claim of the black firefighters."6
In its opinion, the Court first held that the threat of a disparate
impact lawsuit can justify disparate treatment of white candidates
only when there is a "strong basis in evidence" that a disparate impact
case would prevail." 7 In this case, the Court held that such a standard
could not possibly be met. Although the black firefighters had easily
demonstrated that the test resulted in disparate impact, this prima
facie case was not enough under antidiscrimination law."8 As the
Court explained:
The problem for respondents is that a prima facie case of
disparate-impact liability-essentially, a threshold showing of a
108. Id. at 2665-66.
109. Id. at 2666.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 2667-70.
113. Id. at 2671.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2664.
116. Id. at 2681.
117. Id. at 2676.
118. Id. at 2677-78.
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significant statistical disparity, and nothing more-is far from a
strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable
under Title VII had it certified the results. That is because the
City could be liable for disparate-impact discrimination only if
the examinations were not job related and consistent with
business necessity, or if there existed an equally valid, less-
discriminatory alternative that served the City's needs but that
the City refused to adopt. We conclude there is no strong basis
in evidence to establish that the test was deficient in either of
these respects.119
Thus, whether a disparate impact claim will prevail depends
upon questions of business necessity, and, in this case, strong
evidence that such a claim would prevail was a prerequisite for
overcoming a countervailing claim of disparate treatment.
How would current jurisprudence impact serious efforts to
diversify corporate boards? In all likelihood, it makes little difference
that the civil rights laws do not apply to them (because board
members are not employees). Even if the laws applied, a firm would
only have to prove that it based its current policy of choosing
directors on various business-related reasons (particularly to increase
shareholder value). This would likely be good enough to rebut a
disparate impact claim. We suspect that the present diversity policy of
most firms (stated as follows) would survive any challenge: a board is
open to nominate eligible minority board members, provided that the
"right" (i.e., those who will help the firm perform better) candidates
can be identified. A more aggressive approach to diversification,
however, may well constitute disparate treatment under current
doctrine, lending legal support to those firms that wish to maintain
the status quo of having a small sampling of women and members of
minority groups present on a mostly white male board.
How much a firm will want to identify such candidates absent
strong evidence that doing so will affect the bottom line for
shareholder value depends in large part on how deeply embedded
diversity has become as a social norm. Diversity has become enough
of a social norm in the area of higher education that the Supreme
Court has twice intervened to set limits. Some Justices have found it a
legally impermissible value to pursue, while others have found it
totally acceptable; the bottom line is that the Court permits diversity
to be taken into account in a limited way, as we saw above.120 The
119. Id. at 2678 (citations omitted).
120. For a discussion of the history of the "diversity debate" and an analysis of the
competing arguments as to whether diversity is a value whose attainment should be sought
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very fact that these cases have made their way to the Supreme Court
suggests that at least certain parties in higher education have adopted
the view that diversity is a value worth pursuing.
Nonetheless, as Ricci illustrates, the current trend in American
law is to favor race-neutral policies. Sumi Cho describes this trend as
"post-racialism,"121 which she defines as follows:
[P]ost-racialism in its current iteration is a twenty-first-century
ideology that reflects a belief that due to the significant racial
progress that has been made, the state need not engage in race-
based decision-making or adopt race-based remedies, and that
civil society should eschew race as a central organizing principle
of social action.12 2
Others write similarly about this phenomenon.23 To the extent
that the financial community has internalized this race-neutral
approach, it will become increasingly difficult for boards themselves
to take the lead in bringing about greater diversity, notwithstanding
that the law is not likely to stop them from doing so.
As we noted earlier, it is not clear what signals will be received
when a firm decides to diversify beyond the social norm of
demonstrating that the firm is not racist or sexist in that its board has
women and minority group members. The law has stopped taking the
lead in the antidiscrimination norms, as it formerly did when
desegregating inns and lunch counters. Now firms themselves must
take the risk of giving the wrong signal to the financial community,
unless greater diversification becomes a more universally accepted
norm.124
There are other reasons for the civil rights laws not to apply to
board selection, the most practical of which is that membership is
highly restricted and is generally administered by nomination
followed by shareholder election. This makes it unlikely that there
will be many plaintiffs who could bring such suits. Our point, though,
is that a review of the civil rights laws, whose values we believe
in the education context, see generally Anthony T. Kronman, Is Diversity a Value in
American Higher Education?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 861 (2000).
121. See Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1594 (2009).
122. Id.
123. See generally Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J.
967 (2010) (criticizing current constitutional and statutory doctrine concerning civil rights
as wrongly assuming that racism has ceased to be an issue in the United States).
124. See Dobbin & Jung, supra note 75, at 828 (observing that these risks are not
negligible, as empirical evidence indicates that investors discount the share price of firms
that increase board gender diversity).
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underlie much of the effort to diversify boards, takes us right back to
shareholder value. The interpretation of the civil rights laws
emphasizing business necessity supports the position that diversifying
boards depends upon empirical research strongly demonstrating that
a diverse board will help firms perform better. Once again, this
contributes to maintaining the status quo of incremental
diversification.
C. Diversity as a Way to Address Board Pathologies
One argument for board diversity is that it could help address the
group pathologies, discussed earlier, that arise from the typical social
identity of boards. A diverse board member could introduce
"cognitive conflict" within the boardroom and thus reshape a social
identity typified by deference, conformity, and stylized conflict. That
is, as social psychologists have explained, group pathologies like
groupthink, where decision-making parties uniformly pursue one path
or strategy, could be undermined if a group member brings forward
other perspectives that are in direct conflict with the group's
inclinations.125 This resistance could in turn spark more discussion, the
consideration of alternative strategies, and/or inquiry into
problematic transactions and compensation arrangements. A diverse
board member could be seen as an ideal candidate for this role of
catalyst for social identity transformation of the board, if one assumes
that the diverse board member's experiences provide her with
different perspectives than those of the typical board member.
There are several obvious problems with this scenario, however.
The social psychological literature suggests that it is difficult for one
person to alter group dynamics, particularly with respect to cohesive
groups.126 Rather, an internal critic of a cohesive group is generally
marginalized by the group and ignored or placed into the innocuous
role of being the "house" critic, and thus he cannot effect any
significant change to the decision-making process or the group's
identity.127 Moreover, since women and ethnic and racial minority
board members may already face a significant risk of being
125. On the general issue of cognitive conflict, see Donald Lange, A Multidimensional
Conceptualization of Organizational Corruption Control, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 710,718-
19 (2008); Ann E. Tenbrunsel et al., Building Houses on Rocks: The Role of the Ethical
Infrastructure in Organizations, 16 SOC. JUST. RES. 285, 295 (2003).
126. See WEICK, supra note 61, at 114 (stating that efforts by individuals are
"compromised" when they act with "little social support").
127. See JANIS, supra note 7, at 114-17. Indeed, having a house critic may make the
group all the more cohesive about its strategies because it can say that it has considered
alternatives and accepted criticism.
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marginalized on boards (i.e., because of conscious and implicit
biases), they could risk being made wholly irrelevant by taking on this
oppositional role. Indeed, they may often be inclined to engage in
self-censorship with respect to any alternative perspective that they
could offer.128 Furthermore, it also seems unfair to force women and
other minorities, who have only entered the boardroom relatively
recently, into this risky confrontational role.
In addition, the women and ethnic and racial minorities who
have arduously climbed up the business hierarchy and who are thus
eligible to be nominated as board candidates are like their white male
counterparts. They, too, have been trained, through their education
and professional careers, to find "natural" the social identity of
boards.12 9 From the social identity perspective, when acting as board
members, they run the risk of bringing nothing new to the table,
certainly not their other identities, especially when they feel pressure
(and have been instructed in the "vetting" process) to conform. Thus,
board diversity is not likely to address group pathologies on boards.
To be blunt, it serves only to expand the gender and racial makeup of
the corporate elite.
There is some evidence that group (and thus board) pathologies
can be addressed by the formation of a significant subgroup within a
group that resists, and changes, the dominant social identity.o In
other words, a coalition of resistance may be formed where coalition
members support each other in their creation of an alternative
subgroup and subgroup identity that, in time, replaces the current
social identity of the group. In corporate boards, this phenomenon
appears to surface within a board in a crisis, when a dominant CEO is
overthrown because of a scandal or firm problem.131 In a related vein,
128. This self-censorship occasionally surfaces in the useful interviews recorded in the
database collected by Professors Broome, Conley, and Krawiec. See Broome et al., supra
note 66, at 784-85.
129. See Kelan & Jones, supra note 60, at 38 (interpreting a study to show that female
MBA students do not "reflect critically on gender discrimination").
130. Cf Linda K. Treviiho et al., Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review, 32 J.
MGMT. 951, 962 (2006) (discussing "the ease with which situationally defined identities
become entrenched within organizations" and how social identities may "compete with
organizationally defined identities").
131. We rely here on anecdotal evidence. The changes to WorldCom, Inc. following its
massive accounting scandal and the removal of corrupt management are one example. See
generally Restoring Trust: Report to Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist.
of N.Y., on Corporate Governance for the Future of MCI, Inc., SEC v. WorldCom, Inc.,
No. 02 Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2003), available at http://fll.findlaw.comlnews.findlaw
.com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/corpgov82603rpt.pdf (reporting on the transformation of
corporate governance and firm attitudes within the former WorldCom after a trustee took
control of the oversight of the firm).
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literature on diversity in business settings suggests that diverse
individuals are more likely to offer their alternative perspectives only
in certain circumstances in the workplace. The individuals must feel
that their input will be respected and that they have a critical mass of
cohorts.132 Therefore, board diversity may turn out to be important in
changing board social identity, but it is likely to be dependent upon
having adequate numbers of diverse board members and
transforming the functioning of boards-both difficult to achieve.
III. OTHER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DIVERSE BOARDS
A. Countering Finance
In our view, diversity advocates should not restrict themselves to,
or even emphasize, justifying board diversity in terms of shareholder
value. As we have suggested above, showing that diverse boards
increase shareholder value is difficult as an empirical matter, and it
makes advocates dependent upon a lengthy causal chain (i.e., from
board composition to shareholder value) for changing the status quo.
More significantly, since we believe that the shareholder value
paradigm is problematic as a normative and policy matter, we prefer
that diversity advocates (and others) not reinforce this normative
perspective on the firm. In addition, it is clear that the case for board
diversity, as for diversity in other contexts, is based upon normative
frameworks other than shareholder value (e.g., to redress past
discrimination).' As some diversity advocates have explained, it
belittles or cheapens the case for board diversity to base it upon the
shareholder value paradigm." In our view, diversity advocates in the
corporate context should base their advocacy upon these frameworks,
just as the frameworks inspire antidiscrimination laws." 5
132. See Erica Gabrielle Foldy et al., Power, Safety and Learning in Radically Diverse
Groups, 8 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC. 25, 26 (2009); see also Jennifer K. Brooke
& Tom R. Tyler, Diversity and Corporate Performance: A Review of the Psychological
Literature, 89 N.C. L. REv. 715, 728-30 (2011) (discussing the importance of employees
feeling as though management values their opinions and takes them into account when
decisions are made).
133. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 81, at 1075 (discussing the use of diversity to
counter implicit biases).
134. See, e.g., Dhir, supra note 72, at 600-01.
135. We provide an example of possible justifications for diversity in the discussion
below. Since we are not scholars who specialize in diversity studies, we leave to others
(particularly the contributors to this issue) an exposition of possible frameworks. For
example, at the end of his commentary, Professor Kang insightfully lays out a justification
for board diversity that does not depend upon shareholder value. Kang, supra note 12, at
943-44. Once again, moreover, we acknowledge his point that diversity advocates are
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One often used example is the signaling effect of a diverse
board.136 As is well known, the argument could be made that a diverse
board, as a signal, may increase a firm's profits. The argument rests
on the premise that customers prefer to give their business to, and
employees are motivated to work harder for, a firm that values
diversity (as shown by its board composition). We do not believe that
a diverse board has to be justified as this kind of a signal, which is
again based upon shareholder value (and hard to establish as an
empirical matter). However, board diversity also signals to
employees, customers, and the community that the firm is inclusive
(and thus not exclusive) with respect to all of its participants and
associates (from the lowest-ranking employees to the most senior
who are the board members). Moreover, this diversity would signal
the firm's compliance with the norms embodied in antidiscrimination
laws. Thus, a diverse board could be justified on the grounds that a
firm should demonstrate acceptance of social values enshrined in the
law, with less emphasis upon the shareholder value perspective. Such
arguments are intended to enhance a firm's prestige in the community
by virtue of the social values that it espouses.
As noted earlier, the law allows corporate boards, when deciding
firm issues such as board composition, to make a "loose" connection
to shareholder value.'37 Certainly, such a case could be made for a
diverse board, and, in our view, there is no reason for diversity
advocates not to take advantage of the law's flexibility on this point.
That is, diversity advocates should offer lip service to finance, but also
introduce other normative frameworks into the discussion. Unless
there is convincing empirical evidence that the introduction of such
values is damaging to shareholder value-which we doubt can be
offered-then the law provides enough flexibility to permit such
arguments to be advanced.
Nonetheless, we understand that diversity advocates are walking
a fine line here. As discussed above, considerable resistance to
diversity may surface from existing executives and board members,
and particularly from institutional investors and money managers,
likely using the shareholder value justification as one of the few discourse strategies
available to them. See id. at 940, 942. We, too, understand that the power of a dominant
ideology is that it controls discourse and thus dictates the kinds of arguments that can even
be articulated on a given subject. As we have suggested and discuss further below,
however, there is more space in current discourse about boards for justifications for
diversity that do not depend upon shareholder value.
136. See Broome & Krawiec, supra note 28, at 447-48.
137. See supra Part II.B.
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steeped as they are in finance and suspicious of anything that suggests
less than true devotion to shareholder value.' 8
Making the challenge even more difficult is the narrow way in
which the Supreme Court has construed the civil rights laws. As
discussed above, attempts to remedy the disparate impact of
employment practices on women and ethnic and racial minorities are
rebutted by business necessity or have even been construed as
themselves a violation of the disparate treatment prong of the civil
rights statutes. This interpretation is by no means necessary, and it is
in fact a departure from prior precedent, as Justice Ginsburg points
out in her dissent in Ricci."9 To the extent that board diversification is
an outgrowth of a culture that values racial and gender equality
stemming from a half century of employment discrimination
legislation, such decisions are likely to place even more burden on
those firms that wish to diversify their boards." Yet the fact that the
courts have not embraced diversity as an appropriate goal in the
enforcement of these laws need not deter a firm from diversifying its
board if significant segments of society are out in front of the law and
accept diversification as a legitimate and praiseworthy goal.
Diversity advocates may argue that it is inappropriate, and even
unfair, to place upon them the burden of challenging, either directly
or indirectly, the shareholder value paradigm, which might hinder the
achievement of the other goals of board diversity and, as we noted
earlier, put current diverse board members in the uncomfortable
position of being seen as only diversity advocates. While this is a
concern, we feel that there is also a risk of reducing board diversity to
including on a board a few diverse directors who share the
shareholder value perspective and who thus expand somewhat the
corporate and financial elite. One compromise that would recognize
the precarious position of diverse board members and would not just
reinforce the shareholder value paradigm would be to place the main
obligation for board diversity upon current board members, who are
138. Again, Dobbin and Jung's evidence with respect to the conduct of smaller money
managers is telling. See Dobbin & Jung, supra note 75, at 828-29.
139. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658,27014)2 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
140. Of course, legislating a minimum percentage of diverse board members-an
approach taken by Norway-would solve this problem in that no firm would have to risk
being an unappreciated pioneer in this regard, but such legislation is not likely to be
enacted and might even be considered unconstitutional if it were. See generally Kate
Sweetman, How Women Have Changed Norway's Boardrooms, HARV. Bus. REv. BLOGS:
HBR Now (July 27, 2009, 4:07 AM), http:/Iblogs.hbr.org/hbr/hbr-now/2009/07/how-
women-have-changed-norways.html (discussing the impact of the Norwegian diversity
legislation on their boards).
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primarily not women or members of racial or ethnic minorities. They
would then have to nominate diverse directors in meaningful
numbers and face the immediate resistance of institutional investors
focused upon shareholder value.'4 1
B. Improvements to Board and Firm Functioning
We also hope that a more diverse board, with members offering
perspectives other than shareholder value, could improve board
functioning as to its supervisory and advisory roles and could reduce
the harmful consequences of the shareholder value perspective. As
one commentator has put it, the hope is that diversity "can act to
create a culture of scrutiny instead of a culture of greed" on corporate
boards. 42 Although, as we have emphasized throughout the Article,
the case for board diversity does not depend upon the practical or
functional outcomes, these outcomes may be a welcomed positive
externality of diversity. To take just one prominent example, much
conduct in public firms that is detrimental both to firms and society
arises from executive compensation practices and related issues (i.e.,
"rents" more generally). Compensation practices, which center on
stock options and which have resulted in extreme pay disparities
within firms, are creatures of finance's agency model.143 Moreover,
many prominent abuses in public firms involve compensation and
related rent-seeking. Stock option backdating comes to mind," as do
the compensation arrangements in financial firms like Merrill Lynch
that continued despite massive losses. 45 There is little evidence that
board members consciously approve of fraud and other abuses in
compensation. However, the social identity shared by the typical
board member makes him deferential to finance-based compensation
141. Our remarks in this paragraph thus represent one response to Professor Kang's
criticism that we do not adequately sympathize with the precarious position of diversity
advocates. See Kang, supra note 12, at 938-39.
142. Steven A. Ramirez, A Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in the
Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption?, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 837, 846 (2003).
143. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF ExECUTIVE COMPENSATION 159-73 (2004) (examining
option compensation practices which provide pay without performance and increase
windfalls).
144. See generally JAMES M. BICKLEY & GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL 33926, STOCK OPTIONS: THE BACKDATING ISSUE (2008) (surveying this issue and
related research).
145. See, e.g., ANDREW M. CUOMO, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATr'Y GEN., No
RHYME OR REASON: THE 'HEADS I WIN, TAILS YOU LOSE' BANK BONUS CULTURE 1-2
(2009), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media-center/2009/july/pdfs/Bonus%20Report
%20Final%207.30.09.pdf.
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arrangements and inclined to approve (and to think as natural) high
compensation for top executives.14 This same social identity prevents
directors from focusing on the consequences of their decisions, such
that the compensation arrangements result in extraordinary wealth
creation for the corporate elite. 147
The hope is that a diverse board (with suitable numbers of
diverse members who would express perspectives other than that of
shareholder value) could help alter the dominant, finance-based
social identity that now characterizes public company boards. As in
all social situations, this would mean the formation of a new social
identity for a particular board that is influenced by the perspectives of
its diverse members and that would not simply reflect the shareholder
value standard. Again to take an example from compensation, a board
with a different social identity might question many compensation
assumptions and practices, such as the sheer size of compensation
packages, the disparity between executive compensation and that of
other employees, the form of the compensation (i.e., primarily stock-
based), and the beliefs with respect to current practices (i.e., one
cannot attract competent executives without it).
A firm with diverse board members could also have a salutary
effect on corporate culture by reaffirming social norms with respect to
antidiscrimination. It is our belief that firms with significant numbers
of women and ethnic and racial minorities on their boards will be less
likely to tolerate discriminatory conduct in the firms themselves, and
be less ready to offer shareholder value justifications for the
discriminatory impact of their employment practices. Even if such
effects are difficult to measure, the benefit of having diverse board
members as role models in high positions and the symbolic value of
their presence for the affirmation of other normative frameworks
than finance are undeniable.
CONCLUSION
Gender, ethnic, and racial diversity on boards of public
companies remains an elusive goal for diversity advocates. Moreover,
these advocates feel the pressure to justify board diversity in terms of
its contribution to shareholder value. This pressure is not surprising,
insofar as the dominant social identity of boards views shareholder
146. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 85-99.
147. See id. at 250. On the strength and pervasiveness of the ideology of finance, see
SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 104-18 (2010).
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value as the ultimate criterion for any action, including eligibility for
the board. However, accepting this criterion poses a problem for
diversity advocates, for they are called upon to justify increased board
representation of women and ethnic and racial minorities with
empirical evidence regarding its contribution to shareholder value.
Such evidence is not strong or definitive, and the chain of causation
from a diverse board to increased shareholder value is a long and
tenuous one. As we have shown, this pressure that makes diversity
secondary to shareholder value finds its counterpart in
antidiscrimination law jurisprudence. Moreover, having diverse board
members, without more, does not appear to improve board decision
making, at least by addressing some well-known board pathologies.
Diversity advocates should not limit themselves to the
shareholder value paradigm, for it obscures the other perspectives
and values that they offer to justify board diversity and reinforces that
paradigm. As it turns out, corporate law provides directors
considerable freedom for their business decisions, which could be
used to accommodate board diversity. We understand that there will
be resistance to, and risks associated with, any questioning of
shareholder value, and we do not intend to ask diversity advocates or
diverse board members alone to carry this burden. Yet we feel that, if
diversity advocates justify board diversity on other grounds and
norms, they could promote a transformation in the social identity of
boards. Although this transformed identity might have a subsidiary
benefit of improving board functioning, it is enough for us that it
reflects and promotes antidiscriminatory norms.
148. However, while board diversity might not help the bottom line in the regular
course of business, the social psychological research discussed earlier does suggest that, in
times of crisis, if a board has diverse enough perspectives, groupthink may be avoided and
better decisions made. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. Since neither the
occurrence of a crisis nor the nature of any crisis that a board may confront is predictable,
such benefits are hard to measure and not likely to affect share prices. Nonetheless, they
may be a positive consequence of an effort to diversify more aggressively.
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